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Pabaiga

Tai paskutinis įrašas tokio formato Įžvalgose. Jau ilgokai nieko nerašiau, bet dabar vėl jaučiu poreikį sugrįžti prie blog’o, tačiau peržvelgęs senesnius įrašus nusprendžiau, kad formatas, kuris buvo iki šiol jau nugyveno savo amželį taip ir nesulaukęs pilnametystės.

Niekaip nepavyko įgyvendinti idėjos sukurti blogą, skirtą “nachališkai politikai Rusijos atžvilgiu”, todėl tenka permąstyti tiek formą, tiek ir turinį ir pereiti prie kitokios koncepcijos, kuri, tikiuosi, turėtų būti įgyvendintą daugių daugiausiai iki rugpjūčio pirmos. Todėl, nesakau sudie, sakau - iki susitikimo.

P.S.: Projekto maketas jau sukasi internete. Kas netingit - paieškokit ;D

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Kelios eilutės apia Paksą

Manau, kad daugelis iš Jūsų esate susipažinę su vakar “Lietuvos Ryte” spausdinamu straipsniu apie Lietuvos politikos gėdos - R. Pakso - mentorių ir “draugelį” p. Borisovą. Jeigu neturėjote tokios galimybės - straipsnį galite rasti čia lietuviškai ir originalo kalba čia.

Pats p. Borisovas mums įdomus tik tiek, kad buvo vienu pagrindinių Pakso “prezidentinės” kompanijos strategu ir, kad tarpininkavo tarp “LukOil” ir Pakso spręndžiant finansavimo klausimus. Įdomiausia šio straipsnio dalis ta, kurioje aiškiai išreikštas Pakso politikos ir dabartinės Rusijos politinio elito santykis:

“Интересно во всей этой истории то, что Паксас был единственным в
Прибалтике политическим деятелем, который хоть в какой-то мере считался
с интересами России, например, лоббировал проект продажи Мажейкяйского
НПЗ российскому «ЛУКОЙЛу». Сейчас операции западных политиков и
бизнесменов по сдерживанию экспансии российского бизнеса в Европу у
всех на слуху, а ведь одной из первых таких историй была именно
отставка пророссийского президента Литвы, случившаяся из-за столь
странного приятельства с Борисовым.”

Nors leidinio, kuriame publikuotas visas straipsnis pabadinimas turi sąsajų su laisve ir nepriklausomybe, tačiau tai tik žodžių žaismas, kuris neturi nieko bendro su realybe. Laikraštis valdomas Kremliui lojalių žmonių, todėl reiškiama tik suderinta su Kremliaus “doktrina” pozicija.

Todėl itin keista, kad publikuojama aukščiau minima pastraipa, kurioje aiškiai nurodomas korupcinis Pakso ryšys su “LukOil”. Be to visas straipsnis “dainuoja ditirambus” šiais personalijai. Meluočiau, kad mane tai stebina. Paksas ir jo komanda visada buvo itin glaudžiais ryšiais susijusi su dabartinės Rusijos politiniu (= ekonominiu) elito. Šie ryšiai visada buv ir bus vasalinio pobūdžio nes su “krmininaldemokratais” save sieja švelniai tariant nerespektabilios personalijos (vien ko verti Ačas, Mazuronis, Šiurkus (įdomu, kodėl jis pasikeitė pavardę ir dabar save vadina Šukrumi?)).

Keisčiausia šioje situacijoje yra tai, kad Lietuvoje vengiama aptarinėti tokią ir panašią informaciją, nors ji pakankamai plačiai žinoma. Dažniausiai apie Pakso “vojažus” į Maskvą ir ryšius su tenykščiais “vadais” atvirai kalbama (kaip nebūtų keista) Rusijos žiniaskladoje. Informacija apie Pakso “lojalumą” rytiniam kaimynui dažniausiai publikuoja atvirai prokremliškuose leidiniuose ir tik tada kai suintensyvėja Maskvos klanų tarpusavio kovos (paskutinį kartą info apie Pakso mėnėsius praleistus minant Rusijos valstybinių institucijų slenksčius buvo pasirodžius beveik prieš metus Modesto Koleravo įkurtame portale regnum.ru).

Norėtųsi tikėti, kad ateityje paprasti Lietuvos piliečiai gaus daugiau info apie “kriminaldemokratines” politines jėgas ir jų tariamą lojalumą Maskvos siuzerenams.

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Kirovo nužudymo aidas

Visiems besidomintiems įvykiais mūsų didžiojoje kaimynėje rekomenduoju perskaityti straipsnį, šiandien spausdinama “The Moscow Times”. Tikrai verta dėmesio analizė atkreipianti dėmesį į svarbias kanotacijas tarp dabartinės Rusijos politinio elito veikimo būdų ir sovietinio, kurio geriausias reprezentantas Stalinas.

Iškart atsiprašau, kad tekstas neišverstas, bet laikas, tiksliau jo trūkumas neleidžia šio teksto padaryti prieinamu visiems lietuviškai kalbantiems žmonėms.

 
Echoes of the Kirov Murder

It
is often very difficult to watch Russia Today, the government-owned
English-language global satellite television channel that was tasked
with creating a positive image of Russia abroad. It has consistently
presented the Kremlin version of Alexander Litvinenko’s murder: that he
was poisoned by Boris Berezovsky or the British secret services. In
classic KGB style, someone is found to claim that the British tried to
recruit him into the Litvinenko-Berezovsky circle of agents.

It is the sort of thing that has an almost comic effect when presented in the West.

 

Inside Russia, perhaps this kind of broadcast sounds
normal. After all, the state controls all the major television media,
and Russians have a natural patriotic wish to believe the message –
particularly when the media insist that the government had no role
whatsoever in the murder.

 

But in the West, this sort of stuff would not pass
the smell test. It reeks of trying to shift the blame — projection of
blame, to use the psychiatric term.

 

It also reeks of what could be called “the Syrian
defense.” Each time a leading anti-Syrian figure is killed in Lebanon,
Syrian leaders say the opposition forces in Lebanon did it in order to
embarrass Syria and harm its international standing. It is as if they
are copying from President Vladimir Putin’s book, or vice versa. These
lines become standard fare in the controlled media at home. In reality,
the anti-Putin forces in Russia and London are afraid of getting
knocked off by Putin, not by Berezovsky.

 

 

Is Russia sinking to the Syrian level?

 

Russia’s political culture leaves a lot to be
desired. It should be setting its standards much higher. Moscow
portrays itself as a Christ-like victim with a God-like omnipotence
that the opposition aggressively tries to besmirch by convoluted and
demonic scheming.

 

It is possible to sink even lower. The whole episode
reflects a culture buried deeply in the KGB tradition. In the Soviet
era, anyone remotely tied to the opposition was forced to confess to
the crime of undermining the country’s progress.

 

This became a systemic practice beginning in 1929.
After the prominent early Bolshevik leader, Sergei Kirov, was murdered
in 1934 at Stalin’s behest, Stalin claimed that the opposition was
guilty of the crime. Stalin used the killing as a pretext for a mass
purge and murder of literally millions of Soviets.

 

The Litvinenko killing has certain echoes of the
Kirov murder. In both cases, the real evidence is ignored or covered
up, while the state becomes preoccupied with finding a scapegoat.

 

Most of the moderate and liberal forces — from
Kremlin spin doctor Gleb Pavlovsky to former Prime Minister Yegor
Gaidar — wanted to stay on good terms with Putin. They supported the
official Kremlin line: It was Putin’s enemies who killed Litvinenko.
The only difference was that they said it was Putin’s hard-line
political enemies from the conservative wing who did it, not liberals
like Berezovsky. Did they hope to prove their loyalty and escape
Putin’s wrath?

 

Russia’s response had its own bizarre logic. For
months, the authorities were ambiguous as to who should be labeled as
the killer. But when Britain demanded former security services officer
Andrei Lugovoi’s extradition, Russia went on the counterattack,
organizing a standing-room-only Lugovoi press conference that was
broadcast in detail on the government-owned television stations.

 

Some Russian commentators have already risen to an
even higher level of conspiracy theory, seeing in this whole episode a
British plot to rally Europe and the United States against Russia. At
the same time, they urge Russia to use the old Soviet geopolitical
strategy of trying to drive a wedge between Europe and the United
States.

 

While Russia relies on the “Syrian defense,” China in
turn has started using the “Russian defense.” Faced with multiple
product-contamination scandals, China has executed the head of its food
and drug regulatory agency. More important, it has gone on a public
relations campaign, attacking U.S. exports for their health defects and
citing misleading statistics to argue that the U.S. record is equally
bad. China complains that it is a victim of unfair treatment and
“double standards.” It’s the exact same complaint the Foreign Ministry
has made about the British for demanding Lugovoi’s extradition while
refusing to extradite Berezovsky back to Russia for a trial. “Double
standard” is what we hear from the Russian elite any time there is any
criticism of Russia about anything.

 

In these ways, the authoritarians of the world have
found a common defense that close themselves off, airtight, from facts
and criticism. They can kill their enemies and blame it on those same
enemies. They can claim that their enemies must have committed the
murder, since the resulting international scandal led to bad publicity
for the regime. They can complain of the “double standards” of the
Western media and of anyone who makes the rather logical assumption
that the regime itself is a prima facie suspect.

 

For the authoritarian regimes to make themselves seem
like big-time victims, however, they have to insert a further premise:
that the Western media wield enormous global power, one far more
terrible than regimes that might kill an odd opponent here or there. It
is an argument that could warm the heart of U.S. conservatives and
neo-conservatives, who, faced with incessant disagreement from the
media and intelligentsia, have also created a high level of criticism
of the power and prejudices of the intellectual class.

 

This media criticism, however, is a poor substitute
for open thinking and debate about the issues raised in the media.
Governments that let themselves be guided by it have a disturbing
tendency to insulate themselves from facts, lose the benefits of media
checks and balances, and go off the deep end.

 

Conservatives in the modern West tend to be more
sober. They know when they are exaggerating for the sake of politics
and cherish the same free media that they love to criticize. Cruder
regimes, however, such as the counterrevolutionary, fascist and Nazi
movements of the last century, don’t want to merely complain and vent
their paranoia about the media and intellectuals. They want to act on
the paranoia.

 

The Putin regime has been prone to act on its
paranoia and on its seemingly unquenchable hatred of individuals and
institutions that have crossed it. The damage to Russian institutions
has been slowly accumulating over the years since 1999. Unfortunately,
it could go much further.

 

Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO, an independent NGO.

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Melo kojos trumpos

Diplomatinis konfilktas tarp Britų salų ir Rusijos gilėja ir akivaizdu, kad ne dėl pirmosios valstybės kaltės. Tačiau svarbu šiek tiek atitolti nuo politinės arenos kovų ir prisiminti teisinę šio konflikto pusę.

Kaip žinia, konfilktą inicijavo Rusija, atsisakiusi išduoti “buvusį” FSB karininką p. Lugovojų įtariamą kito buvusio FSB karininko nužudymu (kodėl pirmu atveju kabutės, manau, aiškinti nereikia). Atsisakymo patenkinti ekstradicijos prašymą pagrindas - Rusijos Federacijos Konstitucijos nuostata draudžianti išduoti piliečius užsienio šalims. Tačiau atsivertus Rusijos Konsituciją matyti, kad Rusijos valdžia nesilaiko savo pačių valstybės pagrindinio teisės akto.

Tokią išvadą daro Stokholmo universiteto profesorius Daniel Tarschys laiške spausdinamame šiandienos “Financial Times“. Šio mokslininko įžvalgą ir norėčiau pateikti:

The claim that the Russian constitution prevents the extradition of the former Russian agent Andrei Lugovoi is contestable.

“It
is true that one article in its bill of rights and freedoms contains
what seems to be a blanket guarantee against the extradition of Russian
citizens, but a subsequent article opens the door for extradition of
indicted persons on the basis of federal law or international treaty.

On
December 10 1999, the Russian Federation ratified three international
treaties on extradition (Council of Europe conventions ETS 024, 086 and
098).

The special reservations and declarations attached to these
ratifications do not seem to vindicate the refusal to extradite Mr
Lugovoi, but any objections to the UK request should at any rate be
based on these texts rather than on the Russian constitution.

Daniel Tarschys,

Professor in Political Science,

University of Stockholm,

Stockholm, Sweden

(Former Secretary-General of the Council of Europe)”

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Šaunuoliai britai!

Neslėpsiu - jau labai seniai esu britofilas. Mėgstu klasikinę britų kultūrą, o ir modernioji taip visai prie širdies. Tačiau šiandienos įvykis mano prielankumą šiai salos valstybei padidino kelis kartus.

Neabejoju, kad tie, kurie bent šiek tiek domisi politinėmis aktualijomis žino, kad pastaruoju metu tarp Rusijos ir Didžiosios Britanijos auga įtampa dėl pirmosios atsisakymo išduoti antrąjai vieną žmogžudyste įtariamą personą. Ta persona Andrejus Lugovojus, kuris nors dabar ir “civilis”, bet glaudžiais ryšiais susijęs su saugumiečių klanais žmogus.

Įtampa augo jau beveik mėnesį kol galų gale britai suvokė, kad dabartinis politinis elitas Rusijoje - žmonės, kurie nežaidžia pagal diplomatines ir tarptautinės teisės taisykles, ir jie supranta tik konfrontacijos kalbą. Todėl šiandien Londone buvo priimtas sprendimas išsiųsti keturis Rusijos diplomatus (net vieno diplomato išsiuntimas - ekstraordinari priemonė, o čia visi keturi) ir persvarstyti bendradarbiavimą tarp šių šalių.

Tvirta, bekompromisiška ir efektyvu. Tokių dalykų mes praktiškai nematome Lietuvos santykiuose su Rusija. Dažniausiai žaidžiamas kažkoks pseudo diplomatinis žaidimėlis, kuris dažniausiai baigiasi stengimusi atsidurti vienoje Rusijos lyderių organizmo dalyje. Tai žema ir niekados nėra ir nebus efektyvu. Todėl net galima prognozuoti, kad iki tol kol Lietuvos užsienio politikos “šulai” nesuras stuburo savy, tol mes ir turėsime visiškai neaiškius santykius su šia Rytų valstybe.

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Rusija smogia Estijai “energetiniu vėzdu”

Kaip praneša internetinis dienraštis lrytas.lt Rusijos geležinkeliai sustabdė naftos tiekimą į Estiją. Nors šį žingsnį valstybinė (t.y. tiesiogiai ir nesislapstant kontroliuojama Kremliaus) įmonė aiškiną “remonto darbais” (kur gi tai girdėta?), bet visiškai aišku, kad prieš Estiją imamasi ekonominio karo.

Neatmestina, kad prieš mūsų kaimynę gali būti imtasi ir daug rimtesnių veiksmų. Yra duomenų, kad į Estiją įvairiais keliais yra gabenami tūkstančiai Putinjungeno vaikėzų, kurie Gegužės 9 - pasaulinę gėdos dieną, gali sukelti rimtas riaušes, prieš kurias nublanks ir praeitos savaitės įvykiai.

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Žioplys Muntianas

Prieš keletą valandų TASS'as įdėjo tokią naujieną:

Lithuania criticises Estonia for Soviet monument

02.05.2007, 17.42

VILNIUS, May 2 (Itar-Tass) — Lithuanian parliament speaker Viktoras
Muntianas has criticised Estonian authorities for the poor preparation
of the dismantlement of the monument to the Soviet Liberator Soldier in
Tallinn.

He urged everyone to understand that Russian people will never
agree to the interpretation of the monument to Soviet soldiers as a
symbol of occupation.

In an interview with radio Ziniu Radias, Muntianias said, “It is
very hard for an ordinary Russian person to understand speeches where
liberation [from Nazi fascists] is linked to occupation.”

Speaking about the Soviet Liberator Soldier in Tallinn, he said,
“The consequences of these actions were not properly forecast.”

Nėra jokios abejonės, kad TASS'as tekstą pasiėmė ir gerokai paredagavo bei priderino prie informacinio karo taktinio plano. To buvo galima buvo tikėtis, bet, kad Muntianas toks kvailas tai aš nesitikėjau. Kaip gali toks aukštas politikas taip išsidurti. Visad buvo žinoma, kad Rusijos žurnaliūgos yra itin geri tekstų redaktoriai, t.y. praktiškai iš kiekvieno žodelio gali padaryti sau reikalingą pareiškimą.

Todėl keista, kai dabartinės situacijos akivaizdoje vienas iš valstybės vadovų taip apsijuokia ir pastato Lietuvą į labai nepatogią situaciją. Šioje situacijoje retorika turi būti vienprasmė ir labai aiški: riaušes provokuoja Maskva, Rusija kišasi į suverenios valstybės reikalus, Sovietų valstybė - nusikalstama valstybė, kurios ideologija turi būti pasmerkta ir uždrausta. Prie tokių frazių nei Ria-Novosti, nei TASS'o redaktoriai negalės prisikabinti.

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Kvailybės viršūnė

Šiandien Rusijos verslo dienraštis Vedomosti, kuriame pateikia informaciją, kaip į įvykius Estijoje reaguoja Rusijos mažmeninės prekybos įmonės. Ypač atkreiptinas dėmesys į ataskaitas apie išimamus produktus vietinei valdžiai ir Rusijos higienos tikrintojų pasiryžimas tik po paminklo perkraustymo patikrinti estiškus produktus:

Эстонию сносят с прилавка

Российские ритейлеры соревнуются в патриотизме
Иван Филиппов
Мария Плис
Ведомости

02.05.2007, №78 (1852)

Не дожидаясь команды сверху, российские
ритейлеры решили бойкотировать товары эстонского производства. Из
“Седьмого континента”, “Копейки” и “Самохвала” в ближайшее время
исчезнут эстонские детские пледы и сыр “Атлет”. Сети, которые пока не
смогли найти в своем ассортименте товары из Эстонии, поддерживают
коллег морально.

Сети “Седьмой континент” и “Самохвал” изымают из продаж все товары
эстонского производства и на неопределенный срок прекращают их закупку.
Соответствующее письмо было направлено министру потребительского рынка
и услуг правительства Московской области Вячеславу Фомичеву.
PR-менеджер группы компаний “Самохвал” Анастасия Денисова выбор
адресата объясняет тем, что именно от областных чиновников зависит
развитие сети в регионе.

В письме говорилось, что компания поддерживает предложение Совета
Федерации разорвать все дипломатические отношения с Эстонией. Денисова
уточнила, что в “Самохвал” из Эстонии поставлялись детские пледы.

Директор по связям с общественностью сети “Копейка” Анастасия Щукина
сообщила, что в сети снят с продаж единственный эстонский товар — сыр
“Атлет”. “Не знаю, каковы потери, но мы решили таким образом обозначить
позицию компании в отношении событий в Эстонии”, — заявила она.
Исчезнут эстонские товары и из магазинов сети “Седьмой континент”. Как
рассказала “Ведомостям” пресс-секретарь сети Валерия Ломоносова, речь
идет о 250 наименованиях товаров, представленных в категориях
“замороженная продукция”, “спиртные напитки” и “консервы”. Назвать
конкретно хотя бы один эстонский бренд или товар Ломоносова не смогла,
но уточнила, что вместе они составляют менее 1% оборота сети. Вся
эстонская продукция исчезнет из магазинов в течение двух суток.
“Мораторий будет действовать до следующего распоряжения руководства”, —
заключает Ломоносова.

Руководство “Семерки” намерено информировать покупателей о своей
гражданской позиции. Как разъясняет Ломоносова, “в магазинах появятся
листовки формата А3 с изображением снесенного памятника, возможно, там
будет текстовое сопровождение”. Сеть “Самохвал” же ограничится
сообщением на сайте компании, комментирует Анастасия Денисова.

Большинство участников рынка поддерживают инициативы “Седьмого
континента” и “Самохвала”, но присоединяться к ним не планируют. “У нас
практически нет эстонских товаров”, — объясняет Геннадий Фролов из
X5 Retail Group. “В нашей ассортиментной матрице эстонских товаров
нет”, — заявляет PR-директор холдинга “Марта” (развивает сети “Билла” и
“Гроссмарт”) Евгений Сухарников. “Экономический бойкот — прерогатива
государства. Мы находимся в тесном контакте с госорганами, если они
вынесут такое решение в адрес Эстонии, мы будем его соблюдать”, —
комментирует Фролов.

“Ритейлеры не должны быть политиками, — считает основной акционер
сети “Магнит” Сергей Галицкий. — То, что эстонцы демонтировали
памятник, мне лично не нравится, но это чужая страна, они имеют право
делать, что хотят. А я не имею права лишать покупателей выбора:
покупать эстонские товары или нет — решать должен потребитель”. И
добавляет, что, если решение о бойкоте эстонских товаров примет
правительство, исполнит его.

Главный санитарный врач Геннадий Онищенко уже объявил о том, что
проверки эстонских товаров, в первую очередь продуктов питания, на
соответствие российским стандартам уже идут. Ритейлеры ощущают эту
работу. По словам топ-менеджера петербургского магазина “Супер Сива”, в
субботу Роспотребнадзор прислал письмо, в котором просит предоставить к
12 часам 2 мая информацию об обороте эстонских товаров в процентах с
1 января. Впрочем, в других сетях про это не слышали.

Оборот между Россией и Эстонией небольшой (см. врез). Если бы речь
шла о стране, чьи товары пользовались бы большим спросом, ритейлеры бы
не проявляли такую инициативность, уверен председатель правления
Международной конфедерации обществ потребителей Дмитрий Янин. “Не
случайно ни одна из компаний-экспортеров, поставляющих в Эстонию
дерево, нефтепродукты или цветные металлы, о добровольном бойкоте не
объявляла”, — резюмирует он.

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Imperinė Rusijos etika

Šiandien Rusijos dienraštis The Moscow Times publikuoja puikų Julijos Latyninos straipsnį apie Rusijos imperinę etiką. Tai išties puikus ir įžvalgus tekstas, o jam dar daugiau svorio priduoda, kad autorė - rusė (atsiprašau, kad tekstas nevalstybine kalba, bet nėra laiko kada išversti):

The Prestige Behind the Imperial Ethic



Russia has once more affirmed its status as a great power and bolstered
its authority in the world on President Vladimir Putin's watch. Shortly
after the State Duma condemned the relocation of a World War II
memorial in Tallinn, the valiant defenders of the Bronze Soldier
provided us with a textbook example of how to fight injustice.

They looted the Wool & Cotton, Sportland and
Hugo Boss stores late last week in the Estonian capital. They looted a
wine shop and burned a few cars. One defender of the monument was
stabbed to death during the riot. Dozens of people, including police,
were injured. A female police officer's leg was broken. Estonian Prime
Minister Andrus Ansip received a death threat by e-mail.

There's nothing new about Russian attempts to implement policies aimed at restoring the country to greatness.

One recent example was in 2005, when thugs in Poland
beat up the children of Russian diplomats and stole their mobile
phones. Putin sharply criticized the actions of Polish authorities. A
few days later, patriots beat up three Poles — two diplomats and a
journalist — on the streets of Moscow.

Another case was in September 2006, when Georgia
detained four Russian military officers on suspicion of espionage.
Georgian Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili identified the officers as
senior members of the General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, or
GRU. The Defense Ministry immediately refuted the insinuation in the
Georgian media that the GRU was involved in intelligence gathering.
Then again, under Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, the GRU may well have
been involved in some other activity, such as cactus farming.

Putin responded with a call
for measures to protect the rights of native vendors in our markets.
After that, Russia declared war — not against Georgia, but against
Georgians living in Russia. The crackdown dealt Georgians a crushing
financial blow that benefited the cops, and the deportation process
claimed several lives.

Now Estonia is feeling the heat.

It should be noted that Russia reacts to external
challenges in a very selective fashion. The Kremlin saw nothing amiss
last July when a North Korean missile landed in Russian waters near the
Pacific port of Nakhodka.

When Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal arrived in Moscow
for a recent official visit, he announced upon landing at the airport
that his movement would not recognize Israel's right to exist, thereby
rendering senseless Russia's attempt to draw him into the negotiating
process. Once again, the Kremlin took the slight in stride.

In other words, Russia never takes offense when a so-called rogue state spits in its face.

There's no point even talking about the official
reaction to events here at home. The parliament was unmoved last week
when the remains of six Soviet World War II pilots buried at a memorial
in Khimki were unearthed by a bulldozer, the gravestones were tossed
around, protesters were beaten by police and the remains went missing.
No one called for a boycott of goods from Khimki or for the mayor to be
declared persona non grata.

Countries that were once part of the Soviet empire –
Poland, Georgia, Estonia — are another matter entirely. When something
happens there, the wrath of Putin, the Russian police and bands of
curiously elusive avengers is always ready to rain down on those who
forget the words of the old song: “Our armor is strong and our tanks
are swift.”

And this wrath delivers tangible results. After its
diplomats were beaten up, Poland, for example, began talking about
allowing the United States to install interceptor missiles on its
territory, a move that infuriated the Kremlin. Georgia appealed to the
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, and the Kremlin still
can't figure out why.

Both of these examples clearly demonstrate how
Putin's foreign policy bolsters Russia's prestige and restores its
former imperial greatness.

Yulia Latynina hosts a political talk show on Ekho Moskvy radio.

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Laiškas iš Talino

Blogas A Step At A Time publikuoja laišką, kuris įvykius Taline stebi iš pačių artimiausių pozicijų:

Letter from Tallinn

MAK writes from Tallinn, Estonia:


Note:
My personal internet and email communications have been problematic.
And then I could not get connected to the internet for a good 24 hours.
The situation is the following. Last night was mostly peaceful here in
Estonia - some acts of vandalism. Today Russian language SMS’s were
sent telling drivers to slow down to a crawl and to honk their horns in
order to impede traffic in Tallinn. Seems to ahve worked to some
degree, but the police are dealing with it. 3000EEK fines. A bigger
worry for me - some of the people there are my colleagues from when I
was the Press Spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - is the
fact that the Estonian Embassy in Moscow has been barricaded by young
people and no one is getting in or out. The protesters are keeping upa
huge racket, throwing things at the building, scrawling graffiti and
they have set up tents and portable toilets - apparently to settle in
for the long haul. Curious that the Russian government, which has been
so quick to disperse Russian demonstrations critical of Putin, is
unable or unwilling to enforce its responsibilities under international
law regarding diplomatic conventions and practices in this case.
Ambassador Marina Kaljurand in an interview on Raadio 4 in Tallinn
(Russian language station) said that many other embassies are sending
them notes of support and criticizing the Russian government for
uncivilized behaviour. Even ordinary Russians have offered their help
which Ms. Kaljurand has declined with thanks, saying that there is no
point in their arguing with organizations with no ideals or principles.

A
major target of criticism in Estonia has been the mayor of Tallinn,
Edgar Savisaar. Despite his popularity among Russians, he has not done
anything to calm things down. Instead, by criticising the Estonian
Government and making apologies in the Russian media, he has added fuel
to the fire. Center Party, which he leads, is planning some sort of
citizens discussion on Friday, but it seems that they have had
difficulty in finding an appropriate venue.

These events bring
me back to my idea that studies should be done about what happens to a
small country that is occupied - in effect hijacked - for a long time.
I think the analogy between what happened to Estonia under Soviet
terror and occupation and the Stockholm syndrome,is quite strong. Plus
you have to add to that the deplorable lack of understanding even today
in international public opinion about communist crimes and how these
abuses were integral parts of the Soviet system designed to shore up
the power of the party dictatorship. The fact that the Russian part of
the Hitler-Stalin equation is not only unpunished, not even repentant
but actually defiant is a stark contrast to the situation in today’s
Germany. The results of the killings and terror, deportations, etc., in
the Baltic states meant not only a loss of freedom and sovereignity,
but also affected people psychologically. Subconscious or actual fear,
the loss of hope for justice has affected these people and their
children for all these years. Young Estonians were raised by parents
who had lived through Soviet terror - the times when people could not
talk freely at home and especially in front of the children.
Independence was restored after 1991, but this was not like the fairy
tale of Sleeping Beauty when all the evil past just dropped away.
Estonia has been independent again for a relatively short time and it
is clear that most of the young adults of today went to school under
Soviet occupation with a curriculum full of propaganda. In my opinion,
what has made everything much more complicated is that the occupation
lasted so long.

The interpretation and role of the collaborators
during a half century of occupation is often painful and yet crucial to
examine and understand. To cover their own guilt and their own roles in
all this, collaborators have often been the ones who try the hardest to
portray it as an Estonian vs Russian issue, not a Communism vs
Democracy issue. They somewhat acknowledge having been part of the
system to some extent, but they excuse this in several ways - “there
was no choice,” “one had to go along to get along,” etc. But they all
claim that they were still good Estonians at heart - not “bad
Russians”. A great deal of self-serving chauvinism comes from those
circles. And if some of these collaborators should still be closely
tied to Moscow and clever demagogues to boot you have a really wicked
mix.

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